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State court or federal court? It makes a difference. 1 Class
actions, because of their potentially high stakes, push the hottest
buttons. Whether perceived or real, the forum selection battle
between plaintiffs seeking to keep cases in state court and defendants
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola of Los Angeles
Law School. Professor Vairo serves on the Board of Editors of MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, and authors the Moore's chapters on removal and venue
problems. She also writes a forum selection column for the National Law
Journal.
1. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and
Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581 (1998) [hereinafter Win Rates
and Removal Jurisdiction] (finding that plaintiffs' success rates in cases
removed to federal court were low compared to cases brought originally in
federal court and to state cases, and that the differing case outcomes might also
be a result of case selection, whereby removed cases represent the weakest
subset of cases litigated); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119 (1998) [hereinafter Litigation
Realities] (applying empirical methodologies to find that forum does in fact
have an effect on the outcome of various phases of litigation).
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trying to remove them to federal court rages on, and Congress and
the President have weighed in big-time. This year's Developments in
the Law issue will focus on the most momentous legislative effort,
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 2 to control the statefederal forum shopping battle that has become so important in
today's litigation climate. On February 18, 2005, President Bush
signed CAFA, which provides for expanded federal jurisdiction over
class actions and seeks to prevent some of the abuses believed to be
associated with class action practice. This issue will explore the nuts
and bolts of CAFA, as well as its ambiguities and anticipated twists
and turns.
A. The Litigation Landscape

To understand CAFA and why it was enacted, one must
understand the litigation dynamics that led to its enactment.
Defendants have long complained about the economic pressure that
class actions place upon them. 3 Consumer class actions, where
individual damages may be minimal, but in the aggregate huge, have
been of particular concern. 4 Critics of class actions complained that
in such cases consumers received little of value, while class counsel
were awarded millions of dollars in fees.5 Although not specifically
responding to these complaints, the federal judiciary, led by the
United States Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
tightened up the class certification process, making federal court less
2. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 4-5, 119 Stat. 4, 9-13 (codified in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
3. See, e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6-7, Gridley v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 269 (Il. 2005) (No. 94144).

Victor E.

Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation
Through LitigationHas Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1216, 123536 (2001) (criticizing "regulation through litigation," particularly in the context
of class actions, and pointing to the economic burden placed on corporate
defendants faced with such litigation); The Business Roundtable, Let's Make a
Federal Case out of Interstate Class Action Lawsuits (2000), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/433.pdf.
4. See Jennifer Gibson, New Rules for Class-Action Settlements: The
Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1103 (2006), for a
thorough discussion of the criticism surrounding consumer class actions and

how CAFA attempts to remedy such concerns.
5. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30 (2004), as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
29-30.
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attractive to plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases. 6 Additionally, the
Court's decisions in the 1986 Trilogy of Summary Judgment cases,7
together with its decision in Daubert v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, have made it tougher for plaintiffs to survive
motions for summary judgments in federal courts.
These federal judicial developments led plaintiffs' lawyers to
seek out state courts more amenable to class certification and jury
trials. 8 In response, defendants increasingly sought to remove cases
from state court to federal court, where they hoped to defeat class9
certification, and more successfully defend their clients' interests.
Plaintiffs learned to defeat the right to removal by naming nondiverse parties as defendants to destroy complete diversity, or by
alleging an amount in controversy less than the amount required for
federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.10
6. See Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The
Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other
Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2000).
7. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (collectively clarifying standards for making
summary judgment motions and for granting summary judgment).
8 See Vairo, supra note 6, at 1596-97.
9. A recently published study by the Federal Judicial Center revealed that
defense attorneys believe that with respect to class action cases, the federal

forum is more beneficial to their clients' interests; as a result they remove
cases based on state law to the federal courts. See THOMAS E. WILLGING &
SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATTORNEY REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AACHEMf
AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON C1V1L RULES

REGARDING A CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS,

4 5, 7 8, 18, 29 31

(2004), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/amortO2.pdf/
$file/amort02.pdf.
However, the study indicates that the rate of class
certification by state and federal judges for the sample involved is virtually the
same. Id. at 34. The study also reported, however, that federal judges were
more than twice as likely to deny class certification. Id. at 35. Other studies
have shown that whether a case stays in state court or is successfully removed
to federal court will make a difference in outcome. See Win Rates and
Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 599-602; Litigation Realities, supra

note 1, at 122-25.
10. The Supreme Court had long held that if any named plaintiff and any
named defendant are citizens of the same state, the action could not be filed in
or removed to federal court under the diversity jurisdiction statute. See
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806). With respect to the amount in
controversy, the Court has held that in most cases, the claims of class members
may not be aggregated to satisfy the statutory greater than $75,000

982

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:979

Neither side could be happy with these developments. While
plaintiffs' attorneys complained of being deprived of their chosen
state court forums, corporate defendants complained of being sued in
"Judicial Hellholes."1
Although the problem might have been
overstated, some state courts, and certain counties within some
states, had become magnets for plaintiffs in certain forms of
litigation.12 CAFA is a significant outgrowth of these dynamics.
CAFA is also significant because it may be only the first step by
Congress and President Bush to reign in what they see as abuses in
the civil justice system. For example, the pending Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act1 3 is primarily aimed at restoring Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 to its full, 1983 draconian version. It also contains a
provision that would restrict the venue for litigation in state and
federal courts to the state in which the plaintiff is domiciled or was
14
injured, or where the defendant is doing business.
B. Purposes of the Class Action FairnessAct
The purpose of CAFA, as Senator Arlen Specter, Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, put it, is

jurisdictional amount requirement. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336338 (1969). Even if a named class member's claim met the jurisdictional
amount requirement, the Supreme Court held in Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291, 301 (1973), that all class members' claims had to allege claims
exceeding $75,000. After CAFA was enacted, the Supreme Court held in
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005),
that supplemental jurisdiction supports the claims of other plaintiffs and class
members so long as the complete diversity requirement is satisfied and at least
one named plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirement of § 1332. In doing
so, the Court ruled that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
overruled Zahn, but not Strawbridge. See infra note 36 and accompanying
text.
11. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at 8-9 (2004),
available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2OO4.pdf.
12. See id. (describing so-called "Judicial Hellholes" as fora sought out by
plaintiffs' lawyers, where judges and juries were particularly likely to award
large verdicts against deep pocket defendants).
13. The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, passed by the House of
Representatives in September 2004, would amend Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 (Rule 11) to its earlier, more draconian, form, applying Rule 11
in certain state cases, and preventing forum shopping. H.R. 4571, 108th Cong.
§§ 2-4 (2004). The bill was reintroduced in the House in early 2005. Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005).
14. H.R. 4571, § 4(a).
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to prevent judge shopping to States and even counties
where courts and judges have a prejudicial predisposition
on cases. Regrettably, the history has been that there are
some States in the United States and even some counties
where there is forum shopping, which means that lawyers
will look to that particular
State, that particular county to
15
get an advantage.
Moreover, the preamble to CAFA purports to "[lt]o amend the
procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions to
assure fairer outcomes
for class members and defendants, and for
' 16
other purposes."
It is fair to note that CAFA is not the first time Congress has
attempted to protect interstate commerce through federal jurisdiction.
About one-hundred years ago, as the United States became more
industrialized after the Civil War and the turn of the nineteenth
century, and business entities came to the forefront of the economy,
17
Congress expanded federal jurisdiction to accommodate industry.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to look at CAFA through the prism
of the Supreme Court's federalism decisions. CAFA will channel
state-claim based litigation to the federal courts, where the
presumption is that class certification will generally be denied. 18
Without the ability to obtain class certification-in state courts
because defendants will remove them and in federal courts because
of the restrictive Amchem decision-the plaintiffs' bar loses its
ability to leverage the claims of thousands of claimants to extract
large settlements from deep pocket corporate defendants. There is
no question that the use of settlement classes often raised serious
questions about whether absent class members were receiving their
due. 19 Moreover, there is no question that there is a role for
15. 151 CONG. REC. S999 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Specter).
16. Preamble to Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4.
17.

Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Origins of a Social Litigation System, in

LITIGATION

AND

EQUALITY:

FEDERAL

DIVERSITY

JURISDICTION

TN

20 (1992).
18. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 1597, 1599 (discussing the impact of
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), on federal courts'
approach to certifying class actions).
19. Under Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940), class action
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870 1958, at 13, 16
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Congress and the courts to play in ensuring fair play to all parties.
Additionally, there appears to be a sound constitutional basis for
CAFA under Article III, Section 2. It has long been understood that
Congress may provide subject matter jurisdiction based on minimal
diversity.20
The question to ask, however, is whether legislation essentially
ousting the state courts from resolving mass tort and other complex
state claim based class action litigation violates the spirit or letter of
the Supreme Court's federalism decisions. Unquestionably, the
removal of state-claim-based litigation to federal court undermines
state autonomy and principles of federalism. 21 Moreover, removal of
state-claim cases to federal court resulting in a dismissal by a federal
judge-as opposed to the potential to get to a jury if the case had
remained in state court-does not seem to square with the spirit of
the Erie doctrine: 22 that the result reached in the federal court be the
same as that reached in the state court across the street.23
The next Parts of this Foreword briefly survey the major
provisions of CAFA. The final Part sets forth a hypothetical case
that provides ample food for thinking through the various provisions
of CAFA that the Developments in the Law issue addresses.
C. Specific Provisionsof CAFA

1. The Class Action Consumer Bill of Rights
Many politicians, consumers, and defendants complained about

judgments are binding on all class members only if the class has been
adequately represented. Both state and federal courts must therefore confirm
only those class action settlements that provide this constitutional minimum.
Vairo, supra note 6, at 1601.
20. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)
(holding that complete diversity is not constitutionally required).
21. See Vairo, supranote 6, at 1610 27.
22. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding there
is no federal general common law).
23. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("[T]he accident
of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away should not lead to a substantially different result."); see also Hanna

v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (discussing the twin aims of the Erie
doctrine, which are prevention of forum shopping and equal administration of
the law).
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so-called coupon settlements prior to CAFA's passage.
Unquestionably, coupon settlements tend to provide class members with
little of value, 25 although plaintiffs' lawyers justify such settlements
because they have the cumulative effect of deterring corporate
defendants from inflicting harms on their consumers. Nonetheless,
CAFA includes a "Consumer Bill of Rights." 26 Section 3 of CAFA
amends the federal judicial code to specify the calculation of
contingent and other attorneys' fees in proposed class action
settlements that provide for the award of coupons to class
members.2 7 It also prohibits a federal district court from approving:
(1) a proposed coupon settlement absent a finding that the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate; 2 8 (2) a proposed settlement
involving payments to class counsel that would result in a net
monetary loss to class members, absent a finding that the loss is
substantially outweighed by nonmonetary benefits; 29 or (3) a
proposed settlement that provides greater sums to some class
30
members solely because they are closer geographically to the court.
Section 3 also specifies requirements for serving notices of proposed
settlements on appropriate State and Federal officials, and prohibits
the court from granting final approval to a proposed settlement
earlier than 90 days after such service. 3 1 In some respects, these
provisions simply codify the best practices of many federal judges,
as well as the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
the federal class action
rule. Now, however, these principles will be
32
enshrined in law.
2. Amending Diversity Jurisdiction
Section 4 is the heart of CAFA. It amends 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the
diversity jurisdiction statute, and vests the federal district courts with

24. See Gibson, supra note 4.
25. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30 (2004), as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
29-30.
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006).
27. § 1712.
28. § 1712(e).
29. § 1713.
30. § 1714.
31. § 1715.
32. See Gibson, supra note 4 (addressing CAFA's Consumer Bill of
Rights).
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original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in
controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs, and
that is between citizens of different States, or citizens of a State and a
foreign State or its citizens or subjects.3 3
The purpose of this
amendment is to abolish the complete diversity rule for class actions,
and to clarify the jurisdictional amount in class action cases. By
specifying that the amount in controversy exceed $5 million, CAFA
sidesteps the supplemental jurisdiction issue that currently divides
the federal courts. 34 Nearly all of the courts of appeals have had to
decide whether a class action is within federal jurisdiction when the
named plaintiff satisfies the $75,000+ jurisdictional amount, but
35
other class members do not individually meet the requirement.
Although the Supreme Court has resolved this issue, 36 the approach
Congress takes in CAFA is to eliminate the need to focus on the
damages of individuals, and instead to look at the amount in
controversy essentially from the defendant's viewpoint-if one
aggregates all of the individual damages, and the amount exceeds $5
million, the case meets the new jurisdictional amount requirement.
As the third Article in this issue demonstrates, the amount in
controversy issue is far from simple, and litigators and courts will
37
need to address many thorny issues.

33. § 1332(d)(2).
34. See Cameron Fredman, Plaintiffs' ParadiseLost: Diversity of Citizenship and Amount in Controversy Under the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005,
39 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1025 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir.
2001); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114 19 (4th Cir. 2001); Meritcare
Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997);
Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Abbot Labs.,
51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided Court,
sub nom. Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (leaving open the
issue of whether section 1367 overrules Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973)).
36. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615
(2005) (holding that supplemental jurisdiction supports the claims of other
plaintiffs and class members so long as the complete diversity requirement is
satisfied and at least one named plaintiff meets the jurisdictional requirement
of § 1332). Exxon Mobil will apply outside of the CAFA context, as, for
example, when multiple plaintiffs join in an action, or a class action does not
meet CAFA's jurisdictional requirements.
37. Fredman, supra note 34 (addressing diversity provisions of CAFA).
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The complexities presented by these amount-in-controversy
issues are likely to pale in comparison, however, to those created by
other provisions in CAFA. In order to obtain the consent of a
sufficient number of Democrat legislators, and in a nod to principles
of federalism, CAFA provides district courts with discretion to
decline to exercise jurisdiction when a balancing of a number of
enumerated factors suggests that the case is not appropriate for
federal resolution. 38 In the interests of justice and based on the
totality of the circumstances, a district court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a class action in which more than one-third but less
than two-thirds of the members of the proposed plaintiff class, in the
aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed,3 9 upon considering:
(A) whether the claims involve matters of national or
interstate interest; (B) whether the claims will be governed
by laws of the State where the action was originally filed or
by the laws of other States; (C) whether the class action has
been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal
jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was brought in a forum
with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged
harm, or the defendants; (E) whether the number of citizens
of the State of original filing in all proposed plaintiff class
is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any
other State and the citizenship of other proposed class
members is dispersed; and (F) whether, during the threeyear period preceding filing, one or more other class actions
asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same
persons have been filed.40
Further, CAFA requires the district court to decline jurisdiction
when certain conditions are met. First, "greater than two-thirds of
the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate" must
' 41
be citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed."
Secondly, at least one defendant must be a defendant "from whom
significant relief is sought ... whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted.., and who is a citizen of
38. § 1332(d)(3).
39. Id.
40. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F).

41. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(1).
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the State in which the action was originally filed., 42 Finally,
"principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related
conduct" 4 3 must have been incurred in the State of original filing,
and "during the three-year period preceding filing ...no other class

action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations
against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other
persons. 44 Alternatively, a district court must decline jurisdiction if
"two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes
in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State
where the action was originally filed., 45 Determining how these
provisions 4 apply
in various cases is likely to prove quite vexing for
6
the courts.

3. Mass Actions
An important aspect of CAFA is that it treats "mass actions" as
class actions for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction and removal.47
Some state courts are rather lenient in allowing plaintiffs to join the
claims of hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs in one case. 48 The
same economic considerations that serve to motivate plaintiffs'
counsel to file class actions and spur defendants' unhappiness with
them are implicated in mass actions. One jury trial with the claims
of multiple plaintiffs joined presents the same kind of "bet your
company" scenario as does a class action, and defendants thus feel
pressured to settle such cases. Under CAFA, a "mass action" is
defined as any civil action in which monetary relief claims of onehundred or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the
ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law
or fact, and where the claims in the mass action satisfy the $5 million
jurisdictional amount requirement.49
42. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(11).
43. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(111).
44. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii).
45. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
46. See Fredman, supra note 34 (surveying and analyzing these problems).
47. § 1332(d)(I 1).
48. For instance, the court in Jefferson County, Mississippi has gained a
reputation for loosely applying joinder rules, which resulted in what was
perceived as improper joinder of plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., AM. TORT
REFORM FOUND., BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003, at 22

(2003), availableat http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2003/report.pdf.
49. § 1332(d)(l1I)(B)(i).
The mass action provision also notes that
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As with the statute's class action provisions, CAFA also
provides a few exceptions for mass actions. A case will not be
deemed a mass action subject to federal jurisdiction if
(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or
occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and
that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States
contiguous to that State; (II) the claims are joined upon
motion of a defendant; (III) all of the claims in the action
are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on
behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported
class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing
such action; or (IV) the claims have been50 consolidated or
coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.
A political compromise, over the objections of much of the
federal judiciary, resulted in a curious provision. Mass actions
removed to federal court may not be transferred to any other court
under the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, unless a
majority of the plaintiffs in the action request transfer pursuant to
§ 1407. 5 1 Thus, the plaintiffs maintain some control over the forum.
As will be discussed below, the case would be removed to a district
court in which the state court action was filed. Thus, plaintiffs filing
mass actions will not have to worry about having their cases
transferred for pretrial purposes to federal court in a different state.
This provision may be good politics, but it will result in
inefficiencies. Moreover, if federal judges hated the sentencing
guidelines, one wonders how they will feel about applying these
provisions. One also wonders how fast and adept plaintiffs' lawyers
will be in pleading around these various provisions. The fourth
Article in this issue helps explicate the problems likely to arise in
connection with the mass action provisions of CAFA.5 2

jurisdiction exists "only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a)," meaning
only over those plaintiffs' claims for which the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. Id.
50. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii).
51. § 1332(d)(11)(C).
52. S. Amy Spencer, Once More Into the Breach, Dear Friends: The Case
for CongressionalRevision of the Mass Actions Provisions in the Class Action

FairnessAct of 2005, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1067 (2006).
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4. Broad Removal Rights
Section 5 of CAFA creates a broad new removal provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1453. 5 3 It provides that a class action may be removed to a
district court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 5' Thus, the case
must be removed to a federal court in the state in which the case is
filed. However, § 1453(b) also exempts class actions, and mass
claims cases, from the 1-year limitation for removal under § 1446(b).
Section 1453 broadens removal rights in two other important ways.
It allows for removal even if any defendant is a citizen of the State in
which the action is brought.5 5 Additionally, a defendant is no longer
required to obtain the consent of all other defendants in order to
remove. 56 Finally, defendants have a broader right under CAFA to
seek review of remand orders. Although § 1447's prohibition of
remand orders generally applies, CAFA provides that a court of
appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court
granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the state
court from which it was removed if application is made to the court
of appeals not less than seven days after entry of the order.5 7 As the
Fredricks Article discusses, there was likely a drafting error in the
provision concerning the time to take an appeal.5 8
CAFA contains a number of other provisions. In keeping with
its recent history of desiring active oversight of the federal judiciary,
section 6 of CAFA directs the Judicial Conference of the United
States to report on class action settlements, including the issuance of
recommendations for best court practices to ensure fairness for class
members and appropriate fees for counsel.
D. A CAFA-Esque Scenario
Many critics of CAFA predicted that its provisions were
sufficiently ambiguous and poorly drafted that the legislation would
provide fodder for litigants to argue about for decades.
This

53. This section is discussed in detail in Lauren D. Fredricks, Removal,
Remand & Other ProceduralIssues Under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 995 (2006).

54. § 1453(b).
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. § 1453(c).
58. Fredricks, supra note 53.
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Developments in the Law issue details many of the problems raised
by the text of CAFA. While reading the Articles contained herein, it
is useful to keep the following hypothetical in mind:
Imagine the booming city of Las Vegas, Nevada. The city has
experienced explosive growth for some decades. The hypothetical
litigation involves a development project gone awry. 59 Developer
KT enters into purchase and sale agreements with prospective buyers
of a residential condominium project. It later abandons the project
and proceeds to sell the site, on which the condominium complex
was to be built, to a third-party. Developer KT reimburses all buyers
with their down payments. Nevertheless, the buyers bring a class
action, purportedly on behalf of hundreds of other buyers. The
buyers file the action in a Nevada state court, naming as defendants
the developer KT, the third-party buyer, and others, seeking recovery
of an alleged $58 million in windfall profits.
Developer KT removes the class action case under CAFA to
federal court. Plaintiffs' counsel responds by filing separate lawsuits
on behalf of the individual buyers who were included in the original
plaintiff class, and also moves to remand the federal case back to
state court.
Defendants counsel, in turn, responds to these
maneuvers by removing the individual lawsuits under CAFA, and by
opposing the motion to remand. Some of the newly removed cases
are assigned to a different federal judge. Initially, the federal district
court judge denies the plaintiffs' motion to remand the class action.
After further hearings, the federal judge handling the class
action case remands that case to Nevada state court, and the federal
judge handling the individual cases also remands those cases to
Nevada state court. The defendants file a notice of appeal within a
few days after entry of the order remanding the cases. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit now must deal with the
various issues raised, but does not issue a scheduling order for
briefing and argument.
The issues presented by the above
hypothetical are numerous.
1. Timing Issues
First, this case does not present one of the most frequently
59. The facts and legal issues presented by this hypothetical are drawn from
an ongoing case. See White v. Krystle Towers, LLC, CV-S-05-0898-RLHPAL (D. Nev. Nov. 3, 2005).
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litigated issues vexing the courts since the enactment of CAFA, that
is, the question of when an action is commenced for the purpose of
removal under CAFA. 60 Nevertheless, it does raise the question of
appellate jurisdiction.
As the Fredricks Article on removal
illustrates, there is an apparently serious drafting error in terms of the
time within which a party may appeal a district court order
concerning a remand to state court.6 1 Section 1453(c)(1) provides
for discretionary appellate review "if application is made to the court
of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order [granting or
denying a remand]. '62 Surely, Congress intended that an appeal be
taken sooner rather than later, and intended that appeals be filed
within seven days of the remand order. 63 Normally, Congress sets
forth the outside date for taking an appeal, and does not impose a
waiting period for taking an appeal.64
Moreover, § 1453(c)(3) requires the appellate courts to render a
decision within a short time frame. If it accepts the appeal, the court
of appeals must issue its final judgment within sixty days from the
date that the appeal is filed.6 5 If a final judgment on the appeal is not
rendered within that period, the appeal is deemed denied. Under
§ 1453(c)(3), a court of appeals has discretion to extend the sixty-day
period for ten days. Thus, it makes sense for the defendants in this
hypothetical litigation to apply for the extension and hope the time it
takes the Ninth Circuit to decide whether to grant the extension tolls
the sixty to seventy day period. In any event, it appears that
Congress wants the forum selection battle to end sooner rather than

60. Accordingly, the hypothetical does not raise the difficult
"commencement" issues that are dealt with in Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: A First Year Retrospective Review, 39
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1135 (2006).
61. See Fredricks, supra note 53.
62. § 1453(c)(1).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 435
F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing analogies between 28 U.S.C. §
1453(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and Congress's intent for parties seeking
an appeal under the former provision to comply with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 5, which sets an outside date for taking an appeal).
65. § 1453(c)(2) (3). Subsection 2 provides for a 60-day period for ruling,
with a 10-day extension permitted under subsection 3. See also Patterson v.
Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopting the Ninth
Circuit's approach).
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later and does not want the litigants to play jurisdictional games.
The end result may, however, be that litigants will face difficulty in
effectively appealing remand orders given the time constraints of §

1453(c).
2. When Is Remand Appropriate?
Turning to the merits, the hypothetical raises interesting
problems. First, one might think that a local development dispute
would easily be beyond the reach of CAFA. However, there was no
question that the Nevada class action fits within CAFA jurisdiction.
The plaintiff class allegedly consisted of "hundreds" of buyers and
an amount in controversy of $58 million. Moreover, the facts
suggest that large numbers of the buyers were citizens of different
states, not citizens of Nevada, and were diverse from at least some of
the defendants. Accordingly, the minimal diversity and amount in
controversy requirements of CAFA were satisfied. Thus, the case
was properly removed to federal court. The question is whether the
case will remain there.
E. Conclusion
This hypothetical raises the difficult question of whether the
case should be remanded to state court based on either the mandatory
or discretionary provisions of CAFA that allow the district court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction. First, some of the defendants were
citizens of Nevada, but were the "primary defendants" citizens of
Nevada or some other state? 66 This will be an important factor that
determines whether it is appropriate for the district court to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction. Second, how many members of the plaintiff
class were citizens of Nevada? If more than two thirds of the
plaintiff class members are citizens of Nevada, then depending on
whether other criteria are satisfied, the district court must remand the
case. 67 On the other hand, if between one third and two thirds of the
members of the plaintiff class are citizens of Nevada, then depending
on whether certain criteria are satisfied, the district court would have
discretion to remand the case. 68 Further, if the court is dealing with
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (2006); see Fredman, supra note 34
(discussing CAFA's ambiguous phrase "primary defendants").
67. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
68. § 1332(d)(3).
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the discretionary range, there are six factors that the court must
balance correctly in determining whether to remand.69
The inquiry of whether to remand is not a simple one. Who is a
primary defendant? CAFA does not provide a definition, although
some legislative history suggests that Congress intended the primary
defendant to mean the real "target[]" of the lawsuit.70 Assuming a
court can identify who the primary defendant is, it must then
determine the citizenship of that defendant.
The rules for
determining citizenship have been modified by Congress in the
context of CAFA.
Third, the removal of the individual actions raises yet another
thorny issue. Obviously the plaintiff was trying to make an end run
around the removal of the original action. Is that what Congress
intended?
Can the mass action provision of CAFA be used
successfully by the defendant to keep those cases in federal court,
assuming the defendant persuades the Ninth Circuit to reverse the
district court order with respect to the original class action case? It is
difficult to believe that Congress would want plaintiffs to be able to
orchestrate such an end run around CAFA by filing individual
lawsuits. Nevertheless, the questions left unanswered by Congress's
drafting of the mass action provisions make it hard for one to
imagine how those provisions could be used successfully by the
defendants in this litigation scenario.
These are only a few of the issues raised by the hypothetical.
The courts have had to deal with many more. The Articles that
follow provide judges and practitioners alike with a guide to the
various issues with which the courts have had to deal and with which
the courts are likely to deal in the coming years.

69. Id.
70. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
41.

